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Summary findings
Galbi analyzes  the role of fcderal  agricultural credits and  Galbi provides an overview  of federal  agro-industrial
subsidies in Russia since  the Gaidar  reforms of January  programs, describing  four types  of support in detail:
1992.  *  Credits and subsidies  to promote private farms.
Pressure on the budget has led to a significant  *  Credits associated with state procurement of
reduction in federal transfers  to the agro-industrial  agricultural products.
complex. Transfers fell from 10 percent of gross  * Subsidies  for agricultural inputs.
domestic product (GDP)  in 1992 to 3 percent of GDP in  *  C :neral subsidies  to agricultural  producers.
1993, and budget transfers for 1994 are only about 2  He shows the difficulty of using federal  transfers to
percent of GDP.  support agriculture when institutions are unstable, the
But the nature of federal transfers to the agro-  govemment's administrative  and regulatory capabilities
iindustrial  complex has not changed  significantly  since  are weak, and information needed for effective  credit
1992, and federal transfers  have tended to impede  allocation is unavailable.
market-oriented reform rather than cnhance it. So  He also shows  the extent to which the framework for
reform in the agriculture  sector has been driven largely  agricultural  policy  has not changed since the Soviet era.
by a budget squeeze on the implementation of policies
that hinder the development  of market-oriented
agriculture.
This  paper  - a product  of the Office  of the Vice  President,  Development  Economics- is part of an ongoi  ag research  on Russian
monetary  and credit policy.  Copies  of the paper are availabkc  free from  the World Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC
20433. Please  contact  Nen Castillo,  coom S9-035,  extension  33490 (37  pages).  March 199S.
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This paper was written under Paulo Vieira da Cunha, DECVP, as part of ongoing
research on Russian monetary and credit policy. It benefited  greatly from Lev
Freinkman's work on federal financial transfers  and local budgets  in Russia, as well as his
additional suggestions  and insights. I am also grateful  for comments  from Karen Brooks,
Qimiao Fan, Tim Heleniak, Vincent Koen, Vera A. Matusevich, Olga Shabalina,  Anning
Wei, and Dennis Whittle. The Common  Security Fornm, an inational  project
examing post-Cold-War  conceptions of security,  provided funding  for part of the research
on which this paper is based.This paper will describe and analyze the role of federal agricultural  credits  and subsidies
in Russia since the Gaidar  reforns of January 1992.  There are two key points. First, pressure
on the budget has led to a significant  reduction in total federal transfers  to the agro-industrial
complex. Federal transfers  to the agro-industial complex fell from 10%  of GDP in 1992 to 3%
of GDP in 1993, and budgeted  transfers in 1994 are about 2% of GIDP.  Second, the nature of
federal trarsfers to the agro-industrial  complex has not changed significantly  since 1992, and
federal transfers have tended to impede market-oriented  reform rather than enhance it. Thus
reform in the agricultural sector  has been driven forward largely by a budgetary  squeeze on the
implementation of policies  that hinder the development of  market-orented agriculture.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The first section  will provide an overview  of
federal agro-industrial  programs,  while four subsequent sections will examine  broad categories
of support in more detail. These categories are credits and subsidies  to promote private farms,
credits associated  with state procurement  of agricultural products, subsidies  for agricultural
inputs, and general agricultural  producer subsidies.  Developments  in these areas show the
difficulty of using federal transfers to support agriculture when institutions  are unstable, the
administrative  and regulatory  capacity of the government is weak, and information  necessary for
effective credit allocation is unavailable.  Developments also show  the extent to which the
framework for agricultural  policy has not changed since the Soviet era1. Federal Programs for the Agro-Industrial  Complex
As a category in Soviet economic  planning, the agro-industrial complex included the
suppliers of agricultural inputs and services, producers of agricultural  goods, and organizations
for processing and distributing  agricultural  products. The transition to markets  is blurring the
boundaries and structure of the agro-industrial  complex.  As part of the conversion  effort,
defense plants were encouraged to take up production of agricultural inputs,  while agricultural
banks are shifting into financing  non-food trade. Nonetheless, the agro-industrial  complex
remains a central category in the Russian budgetary process.
The ago-industrial complex  traditionally  ranked with the military-industial complex as
having top priority in the allocation of state resources.  Three important  budgetary  categnries of
state support for the agro-industrial  complex are input cost subsidies for agricultural  producers,
procurement credits and subsidies and general agricultural producer subsidies  (including
investnent funds and support for social infrastructure). Table 1 shows the evolution  of these
categories of support. These aggregate  figures make no distinction between  credits and
subsidies.  However, for the agricultural  sector the importance of the distinction  between credits
and subsidies is greatly reduced by chronic default in the repayment of state credit and highly
negative real interest rates produced  by low nominal interest rates and high inflation.'
2Table 1. Federal  Transfers to the Agro-Industrial Complex (as % of GDP)
category  1992  1993  1994 budgeted
private farmers  0.74  0.19  0.02
input cost subsidies  0.83  0.08  0.13
procurement  4.47  1.57  0.87.
credits/subsidies
general producer  4.05  1.33  0.94
credit/subsidies
total  10.09  3.17  1.96
Source: Freinikan  (1994) and Budget RF (1994). The nominal figures for Inpul subsidies procurement  subsidies,  and general
producer subsidies were (in bin. Rb) 192:  809, 151  .791;  1993: 2540,  113,2446;  1994: 6400, 1802.  6126. The nominai  GDP
figures  for  1992-4  are respectively 18.1.  162,  and 623 tri. Rb. These figures exdude interest  rate  subsidies,  tax  cxemptions, and
centralized imports  of ag. inputs. as well as general  subsidies  for producers  of agricultural Inputs. The 1994  proumement  credits
indude  Rb  1.8 trl. to covcr purchases  of grain  from the 1993  harvest.
Several important  points are apparent from Table 1. First, the over-all  volume of federal
transfers to the agro-industrial  complex has been reduced by more than a factor  of four since
1992. While the 1992  and 1993  figuires  represent actual disbursements,  the 1994 figures are
from the budget passed in June 1994. Additional comrnmitments  have been made outside  the
budget, and an Izvestiya investigation  into agricultural finance reported total commitments  for
1994 as equal to 2.9% of GDP. 2 However, as in the previous two years, disbursements  have
fallen significantly below  budgetary commitments, and the same source gives  disbursements
through November 1994  as 1.3%  of GDP. 3 In any case there is a clear downward  trend in total
disbursements to the agro-industrial  complex.
There has been little change, however, in the structure of agricultural  programs. Funds
for state procurement and general subsidies for agricultural are the most important  categories of
support and are roughly equal in size. Grain credits dominate the procurement  transfers while
general support for producers  seems to consist largely of ad-hoc subsidies. In 1994 one new
3program of support for agriculturc  was introduced: funds amounting  to about a twelfth of total
support for agriculture  were allocated to setting up a fnid of equipment  that could be rented to
food processors. However,  this program was not carried out and no fumds  were disbursed.
Funding for agricultural  research has continued at a relatively high level. Budgeted funding for
agricultural research in 1994 amounted  to about $127 million, an amount equal to 61% of the
amount of federal funding  assigned to the Russian Academy of Science,  including  the Ural and
Siberian sections.'
IL  Promoting Private Farming
While personal subsidiary  plots have long played a key role in Russian agriculure,
legislation enabling independent  private farns  was enacted only in December  of 1990.5 This
legislation provided three means for the formation of private fanms. One  is that a member of a
collective or state farm could claim his or her share of land and equipment  from the collective
and exit to form a small farm.  State and collective farms were also required to turn over of
portion of their "underutilized' land to the local Soviet. This land is to be distibuted to other
persons who want to become  farmers.  Persons who want to become farmers  can also buy land
from the state or lease it from other owners.
In addition to providing  enabling legislation, the Russian government  also provided
subsidies for private farmers. In the spring of 1991 the Russian government  provided a billion
rubles (about $38 million  at the average 1991 exchange rate) to the newly formed Association of
4Peasant Farms and Cooperatives  (AICKOR).  The justification for the budgetary allocution was
to promote the development  of independent  private farms. These funds were used in part to
build up AKKOR, which set up a central office in Moscow and affiliates  in all tle regions of
Russia.  Budgetary funds and credits were also distributed to the regional  affiliates  based on their
number of farmers and acreage that that fanners held.  The governing  committees  of the local
affiliates made the ultimate decisions about the allocation of local subsidies  and credits.'
The amount of resources that the government provided to new independent  private
farmers in 1991 and 1992 was relatively large. As Table 2 shows,  transfers  to support private
farming in 1991, relative  to the number of independent  private famers active in mid-  1991,
amounted to about two hundred and twenty times the average monthly industrial  wage. In 1992
the level of support fell slightly while the mix of support shifted more towards directed credits.
These credits were issued at 8% interest per year. About 60% of the credit  was one-year credit
and 40%  was five-year  credit7 In light of the very high inflation rates (1800% in 1992), these
credits were virtually equivalent to a subsidy.
After 1992 the overall volume of state support for private farmers dropped sharply,
falling from one hundred and seventy-five  times the average monthly industrial wage in 1992  to
twenty times the monthly wage in 1993. Within the overall lower  volume of support, the
importance of directed credits increased sharply. However,  in the fall of 1993 moves were taken
to eliminate directed credits. While directed credit figures for 1994  are not available, the
magnitude of such credits is probably small. Overall, the volume of support for private famers
continued to drop sharply, falling in real terms by about a factor often.
5Table 2. Statc Support for Private Fanns
U  of farms  budgetary  central credit  total transfer relative
year  (ths.)  subsidy (bin.  (bin. Rb)  to monthly ind. wage
.,__  .__  _  .Rb)
1991  25  1.7  1.3  219
1992  129  55  79  175
1993  258  22  288  20
1994  286  127  (small)  2
Notes and  sources: The  number  of [arms  is amId-year (I July) tigure flom Kiselcv  (1994). Gaskomstat  (1994a)  p. 3,
(1994b) p. 47. Budgevry subsidies  are from personal  communication. Freinkman  (1994),  and Budget  RF  (194).
The budget  figure  fbr 1994  has  been  multiplied  by .51.  the  implemenation  factor  fmm  1993.  Izvestiya(1994)  gave  a
figure of Rb 112.2  bin. Ccnral  credit flgures  arm  from Kisciev (1994) p. 78, and pcrsoni" .ommunication  from  the
Russian Farmers'  Fund,  where  the 1993  figure  has  been scaled up from a year-to-dae  flgure  fior  20  Sept.  1993.
The possijility of receiving  state support probably played a key role in the rapid growth
of private farms.  From mid-1991  to mid-1992 the number of private farms  increased  by a factor
of five, and then doubled  from mid-1992 to mid-1993 to reach 258 thousand. Some of the
farmers who began in 1991  drew upon their own savings, while in JanuaTy  1992  the savings of
the population were largely wiped out by inflation.  By the end of 1992  credit appears as a major
item in the operating balance  of the new private farmers, amounting  to 180%  of gross  revenues.
Other evidence suggests  that 43% of independent  private farners  in 1992 received  no credit at
all. 9 This suggests that the credit to revenue ratio was significantly higher for those who actually
did receive credit. Thus receiving or not receiving state credit was an enormously  significant
factor for a farmer's financial  position.
The issue of who would  be provided with start-up capital, and how state support would
be divided between setting  up new private farms and supporting already  established  independent
private farims,  was never openly addressed." 0 This is not surprising, since such a question would
focus on the allocation of capital within AKKOR, and hence be divisive. A typical way of
6avoiding the issue wias  to treat it as an issue of technical experase. As one Russian academic put
it with respect to land distribution, "...not everyone has the right to land, but only the best of the
best, those who are experienced  and who are trained professionals.""  While  the rights of
members of states or collective  farms to receive land is defined in statutes, and does not include.
expertise or training as criteria, the allocation of land to imnmigranti  from towns or the army is
significantly affected  by such notions of expertise.1 2 These notions tend to ignore the issue of
who decides who is skilled  and anpropriately trained.  Moreover,  an independent  fanner is first
and foremost a small business person. A major problem of post-communist  economic
transformation is that under communism small business was systematically  and effectively
repressed. It is not possible or desirable  to use the past to try to identify  who will be successful
in a future that must be much different from the past.
The information  necessary  for effective resource allocation  emerges only over time with
the success and failure  of individual  farmers. Since information on the performance  and credit
worthiness of the new farmers was initially lacking, effective credit institutions  would have
provided small amounts of credit and built upon accumulated performance  information  to expand
credit to successful  private farmers. More pressure for self-financing  would have helped to
insure that farmers who were able to generate cash-flow from farming were the ones who
expanded.
The policy followed,  which issued large lump sum disbursements  of credit  through a
murky political process, is not likely  to promote the development of efficient private farmers.
While systematic evidence  is not available, anecdotal evidence suggests  that the default rate on
state credits to private farmers  has been high.  When the level of state support for private farmers
7fell in 1993, the growth rate of private farms slowed dramatically  and the failure rate increased
(see Tables 2 and 3).  Moreover, grain yields on private farms have turned out to bc 18% lower
than on state and collective  farms, which themselves are widely recognized  L>  being woefully
inefficient.''
Table 3. Farm  Failure Rates
period  # of failed farns  in period  % of active (end of period)
1992  5118  2.8
I'st half, 1993  5800  2.2
2'nd half, 1993  8300  3.1
I st half, 1994  12100  6.6  l
Sourcc: Oaswkmstat  (19%4)  pp. 3-5,  (1994b)  pp  47-5.
There is, however, at least one potentially promising sign. While the total volume of
agricultural credit  fell in real terms by about two-thirds from 1992  to 1993, a larger share of
credit appears to have been mobilized  privately. In 1992 the average  volume of credit that
private farmers received was 67% of the volume of directed state credits for private farmers,
while in 1993  this figure rose to 134%.4" This shift suggests that private rural credit markets are
developing.'" One would expect such markets to provide short-term  credits, and in fact the share
of short-term credits in the credit that private farmers received  rose from 27% in 1992  to 53% in
1993.36 Private creditors  who want to be repaid have a good incentive  to lend only to famers
who they know are efficient. On the other hand, private lending may also be seeking out poor
farmers with valuable land that might be seized in the likely event of default on the loan.
The attempt to create private farmers through state credits and subsidies  tumed out to be a
costly and ineffective  way to promote agricultural reform. The large transfers obscured market
forces that would select and reward private farmers for their performance  in farming. Theattempt  created  a new  central  bureaucracy,  AKKOR. While AKKOR  has  important  functions  to
serve in providing  tet.hnical  assistance  and disseminating  information,  its existence  largely
depends  on its ability  to lobby  the government  for credits  and subsidies.  In order  for AKKOR  to
gain bargaining  powcr,  it has  to provide  support  for  other stote  bureaucracies.  Thus  in early 1992
the AKKOR  leadership  agreed  with  the Russian  government  that  peasant  farmers  would  deliver
25% of their products  to state  procurement  agencies  at market  prices  in order  to receive  support
channeled  through  AKKOR. 7 While  the enforceability  or even  the meaning  of such  an
agreement  is questionable,  it illustrates  the extent  to which  policy  toward  private  farns fell
within  the traditional  planning  framework. 1 8
III. Procurement  Credit  and  the Marketing  of Agricultural  Products
While  the volume  of state  procurement  has fallen  significantly  since  the late 1980's,  the
state still purchases  a significant  share  of major  agricultural  products. In 1993  about 50%  of
livestock  products  were purchased  through  state  procurement,  while  the figure  for  plant  products
was about  25%. See  Table  4. Production  that the state did not procure  includes  product  that
spoiled  or rotted  (thought  to amount  to 20-30%  of production),  product  consumed  on farm,
product  sold  or bartered  directly  from  the farn, and product  sold  to private  distributors.  The total
cost of products  that  the state  procured  in 1993  amounted  to 3.7%  of 1993  GDP.
9Table 4. The Significance of State Procurement
procurement  as  procurement as  total volume of  total cost of
% of prod'n,  % of prod'n,  procurement  procurement
product  ave. 1986-90  1993  1993, ths. tons  1993, bil. Rub.
milk  72.1  52.4  24632  1188
meat  74.5  49.4  5273  1886
eggs  70.9  60.0  22789  476
grain  32.9  27.7  27968  1801
potatoes  22.4  4.4  1670  112
vegetables  66.5  21.7  2122  315
sugar beets  86.7  27.7  7064  176
sunflower  76.1  23.0  645  59
Source:  Calculated  from Ministry of Agriculture  (1994a,b).
State procurement  is used in part to fill federal and regional food funds. The melange of
recipients of products from the federal food fund illustrates  the persistence of traditional forms of
resource allocation. For example , in 1993 the federal food fund was ordered  to deliver 1.8
thousand tons of milk to the Russian meteorological service, 7.2 thousand  tons of meat to the tax
service, and 65 million eggs to the joint stock company Gasprom, among other recipients.  As
Table 5 illustrates, govermment  organs of various sorts are very significant  customers  of the
federal and regional food funds.
10Table  5. Allocation  of Food  from Federal  and Regional  Food  Funds  in 1993
(ths.  tons)
recipient  meat  milk  eggs  grain  sugar  vegetables
Moscow  550  4000  1430  1350  554  390
St. Petersburg  150  1400  800  700  270  190
military  492  2408  1362  1887  205  417
govermment  organs  120  1530  374  2423  764  4
enterprises  57  436  358  0  329  16
regions  179  1489  94  17665  1368  209
others  21  600  1290  3613  398  0
total allocation  1570  11863  5709  27638  3888  1235
firom  fed.  and
reg'n food funds
planned  size  of  983  6042  5833  11828  784  1245
fed. foodfund  _
residual  (reg'n  587  5821  -124  15810  3104  -10
food fund, waste)
Sourcc:  Food Ucrce RF (1993).
The 1994  legislation  concerning  state  procurement  gives  some  indication  of less  top-
down control  over procurement. 19 In place  of the detailed  allocations  set out in 1993,  the 1994
legislation  merely  indicates  that the federal  food fund is to provide  for  the needs  of the military
and equivalent  consumers,  the Far  North  and equivalent  locations,  and in part  Moscow  and St.
Petersburg.  In addition,  the Trade  Committee  of the Russian  Federation  is assigned  the task of
setting  up government  reserves  of meat  and meat products,  milk  and milk  products,  sugar,
vegetable  oil, and fish  and fish conserves.  Regional  food funds  are supposed  to be formed  by
local governments  with  funds  that they independently  secure.
While  in the 1994  federal  food  procurement  legislation  there  is less emphasis  on detailed
allocations,  there are some  dramatic  changes  in the composition  of the  federal  food  fund. Federal
procurement  plans  for  meat  and sugar  are 30%  and 80%  higher  than .st year,  while  procurement
11targets for eggs and vegetables are 51% and 32% lower.  These changes are much too large to be
driven by changes in consumption;  they may instead reflect shifts in bargaining  power and a
preference for higher value food products.
State subsidies and credits are directly related to the pattern of state  procurement shares
across products and over time in Table 4. Milk, meat, and eggs are products  for which state
procurement takes up the largest shares of production. As Section V discusses,  these products
have received the bulk of product-oriented  production subsidies.  Such subsidies  naturally orient
producers toward state marketing  channels. Grain has seen the smallest drop in the share of state
procurement.  As Table 6 indicates,  procurement  credits for grain make up the bulk of
procurement credits. Potatoes, on the other hand, are a subsistence product  largely grown in
subsidiary plots, and have attracted  relatively little state supporL
Table 6. Directed  Credits for Agricultural Procurement  (bln. Rb)
year  1992  1993  1994  budgeted
grain  641  1956  n/a
vegetables  128  229  n/a
rural retailers  41  90  n/a
other  0  165  n/a
total  809  2470  5400
as % of GDP  4.5  1.6  1.0
Source:  Freinianan  (1994).  Table  2. and Budget  RF (1994). The 1994 figure  includes  Rb 1.S  tin.  issued  to cover  debts  for
product  procured  in 1993. See  westiya  (1  994).
There is a sharp contrast  between the use of state procurement credit  for grain and
vegetables and the absence of procurement  credit for livestock products. It does not appear  to be
the case that procurement  credits for livestock products are provided through  regional  budgets.'
The need for credit does not appear  to be associated with the process of regional  redistribution of
food, since the pattems for grain and vegetables are much different. Almost  half of state
12procurement of vegetables  is used to provision Moscow and St. Petersburg,  while there are no
regional vegetable funds. In contrast, the total volume of grain in regional grain funds is about a
third larger than the volume of grain in the federal fund, and regional  grain transfers are large
relative to total state deliveries  of grain.
While grain procurement  credit amnounts  to 80% of total state procurement  credit, the cost
of procuring grain is not a convincing rationale for issuing state credit for that purpose.  The
total cost of  state purchases of other commodities. such as meat and milk, is about  the same as
the cost of state purchases  of grain (see Table 4).  Since most grain is harvested during August
and September, there is significant seasonality associated with grain production. However,  there
is also significant seasonality  associated  with milk; in early summer milk production is about 2.5
times greater than in the winter. 2'  Moreover, grain is an alternative  to rubles as a store of value
and it may provide a  less risky form of wealth than rubles in the current environment  of
macroeconomic uncertainty. With the development and privatization  of storage  facilities,
producers will not rush to sell their grain immediately, and the government  does not need to rush
to provide credit so that it all can be bought immediately.
While even in a comparative  sense the case for state procurement  credits seems weak, the
amount of resources involved  is large. In 1992 federal credits for state procurement  were of an
amount equal to 4.5% of GDP. Federal procurement credits in 1993  fell to an amount equal to
1.6% of GDP, and the 1994  budgeted level is equivalent to 1.0% of GDP. See Table 6. While
funds for state procurement  have been fallmg, federal credit for the creation of food funds
remains the largest item under agriculture in the 1994 federal budget.
13The 1994 budget explicitly notes that budgetary funds for procurement  are issued  "on the
basis that they are to be returned." Given inflation rates on the order of 10% a month, simply
returning this money after six months or a year (a typical term for procurement credits) implies a
significant real transfer to the recipients and loss for the buldget. Moreover, credits provided  for
procurement in the past have not been repaid, as the special remark  in the budget  hints. In 1992,
about two-thirds of grain procurement credits were not returned on tirne, and ia 1993 more grain
procurement credits were rescheduled. In 1993 41% of all credits  issued for the agricultural
sector were rescheduled.'
Private agricultural  marketing and distribution companies face large disadvantages  in
competing with state procurement  agencies. A typical argument for the necessity  of state
procurement is that there are no other firms to take up the job.  But private firms will not develop
rapidly given the large volume of state procurement and special credit lines for state procurement
agencies.  Private firms  trading in grain and vegetables have to borrow working capital  at
commercial interest rates, and hence face large disadvantages in competing with state agencies
trading on highly subsidized  state credits. Moreover, state procurement  agencies' shipments  to
govermnent organs can be used to offset the state credits they have already received.  Thus
payment is assured, a crucial  competitive advantage in an environment  where contracts  are
difficult to enforce and there is a large outstanding stock of inter-enterprise  arrears.
Russian history provides some indication of the possible significance  of private provision
of grain procurement credit  Before the Bolshevik Revolution,  the State Bank provided only
11% of credit for grain procurement  and distribution, while state railroads provided another 6%.
Most state credit was directed  to marginal markets in outlying areas. Private traders supplied
14credit in major markets, and they supplied 83% of credit overall.  This is not surprising. Credit
associated with grain wholesaling is a relatively simple form of short-term  credit  that does not
require a sophisticated  financial system. Such credit is often provided between private buyers
and sellers as part of terms of sale, and such arrangements contribute  to the development  of more
sophisticated financial institutions.
The  Administration of Grain Credits
In order to better understand  the effectiveness and cost of state procurement,  it is worth
examining in detail grain procurement  credits, which amount to about 80% of total state
procurement credits. Federal procurement  of gain  is carried out by Roskhleb,  ajoint-stock
company. 2'  By decree the price of grain  is determined by negotiations among  the Ministry of
Agriculture, Roskhleb, the Ministry of Finance, the Price Committee, plenipotentiaries  of the
Agrarian Union, AKKOR, and other organizations  representing the interests of producers and
consumers. In recent years the Prime Minister has played a leading role in price negotiations. In
a market economy, only the purchaser  of grain would be concerned about the price of grain. In
this case the price of grain involves negotiations at the highest level of government  because the
govemment has a large stake in the process through its provision of subsidized  credit.
A key issue in the centralized  price negotiations has been parity with the world price for
grain.  However,  such parity is not appropriate given the centralized  price setting  mechanism and
the weak private links between the Russian and world grain markets.'  The domestic grain
supply curve facing the govermment  is significantly more inelastic than would  be the case for
small buyers in a large market. If the government wants to buy a larger amount  of grain, it has to
15pay a higher price. This is less true in the  international market, since it is larger and more
competitive.  Thus a cost-minimizing  procurement program, if it involved  intemational  and
domestic purchases  of grain, would imply a higher price for intemationally  purchased  grain than
for domestic grain. 2'
Centralized  price setfing for grain inevitably leads to struggles over quantities,  since
prices are not allowed to clear the market. In particular, it is difficult to predict the amount of
grain that will actually be procured, since that depends on how the fixed price relates to evolving
conditions in the market  In the past the govenment  has reacted by tuming to imports to make
up for procurement  shortfalls. One implication of the price-setting  process is that fluctuations in
grain imports may have litle relation  to the overall fluctuations in the size of the harvest  A
regression of the logarithm  of grain imports in the USSR from 1963 to 1991  gives the following
results:
LGIt = .18 + .36 LGIt-I + .063 TRt  + .20 LHRt  r2=.60,  c = .71, DW=2.0
(5.1)  (.19)  (.029)  (1.0)
where LGI  is  the logarithm of grain imports, TR is a time trend, and LHR is the size of the
harvest (standard  errors are in parenthesis  under the coefficLents).  The large standard error on the
coefficient of LHR means that there is considerable volatility in grain imports  that variations in
the size of the harvest  cannot explain. Such variations in imports are consistent  with the
implications of a centralized  process of state procurement: the government  has purchased grain
internationally to make up for domestic procurement shortfalls  rather than domestic  production
shortfallS2
16The Regional Distribution of Grain Credits
While  the logic  of markets  and competition  indicates  that state  grain  procurement  credits
suppress  and distort  the development  of wholesale  and distribution  facilities,  perhaps  the most
serious  flaw in the current  system  of state  grain credits  is the lack of supervision  and
accountability.' In 1992  Roskhleb  procured  26 million  tons  of grain  at an average  price of Rb
12000  per ton. Under  the grain  procurement  program,  Rb 620 billion  of credit  (equivalent  to
3.5% of 1992  GDP)  was  issued  to Roskhleb. This  volume  of credit  amounts  to about  Rb 24000
per ton of grain  procured,  i.e.,  about twice  the average  price of grain. Thus  at least  half of the
grain credits  must have  been  used for  purposes  other  than to pay producers  of grain
There  are considerable  regional  disparities  in the distribution  of grain  credits. Moscow
City, for example,  received  Rb 16.8  billion  in grain credits  while St. Petersburg  received  Rb 1.8
billion. All of these credits  apparently  went for grain  distribution  and processing,  yet it is hard to
understand  why  Moscow,  with  a population  80%  larger  than St Petersburg,  needed  over  9 times
as much credit  for  these  purposes. There  are also significant  variations  in credit  volumes  in
regions where  grain  was  procured. In Orlovskia  and Riazonskiai  Oblasts  the amount  of grain
credit per ton of grain  procured  was  Rb 11000  and  Rb 14000  respectively.  In contrast,  Tul'skaia
Oblast,  which  is geographically  located  between  them,  received  Rb 26000  per ton of grain
procured. Sverdlovskaia  Oblast  provides  an extreme  example. It received  Rb  23 billion  in gamin
credits  while  only 5.2  thousand  tons  of grain  were procured  in the oblast Thus  Sverdlovskaia
Oblast  received  over  Rb  4 million  per ton of grain  procured.
17Part of grain  credits  issued  in 1992  went for  grain-processing  industries.  Bread-making  is
by far the most important  such  industry.  Another  part of grain  credits  went  for  grain
procurement  and distribution.  Inter-regional  shipments  of grain  compensate  for  the difference
between  grain  used for bread  production  in a region  and grain  procured  in the region  (bread  is not
shipped  over  significant  distances).  Separating  the credits  for  bread-making  from  those  for  grain
procurement  and distribution  is a first  step in understanding  the regional  pattem  of grain  credits.
Using  the regional  distribution  of grain credit  in 1992,  one can  estimate  the average
amount  of credit associated  with  regional  bread  demand  and the average  amount  of credit
associated  with procurement  costs. Let Br represent  bread  consumption  in region  r in millions  of
kilograms. Such  data  can  be calculated  from population  and regional  bread  consumption  figures
available  from Goskomstat Let  PCr  represent  procurement  costs  in millions  of rubles. PCr  is
equal  to regional  procurement  volume  times  the average  price  per ton of grain  in the region.'
Then  a simple  model  of the distribution  of grain  credit  CRr in millions  of rubles  across  regions  is
CRr  = 33.8  + 13.1  Br + 1.23  PCr + Ur, r2=.85, c; = 3655
(798)  (2.7)  (.076)
where  Ur is the unexplained  component  of the regional  grain  credite 3
These  results  are interesting  in several  respects. They  indicate  that  an additional  kilogram
of bread  consumption  in a region  was  associated  with an additional  13.1  rubles  of grain  credit.
In contrast,  the procurement  of an additional  ruble  worth  of grain  was associated  with  an
additional  1.23  rubles  of grain  credit.  These  results  suggest  that about  a third  of total  gamin  credit
in 1992  went to support  bread-making  industries." The additional  credit  associated  with  grain
18procurement (0.23 rubles per ruble of grain procured) may have been to cover  storage and
distribution costs. These costs include the costs of interregional shipments  of grain, which in
1992 had gross volume of 17.7  million tons and net volume 14.7 million tons.2
While the above model allows one to estimate some interesting parameters,  in an
econornic sense it does not fit very well. The r2 for the model is relatively  high because there are
big differences in population and procurement  volumes across regions, and these are correlated
with the volume of credit allocated. However, the residual for the model amounts to 42% of the
average credit disbursement among  regions. Large differences in credits  across  regions remain
unexplained by differences in regional bread consumption and regional procurement  costs. 3 3 For
example, in Novgorodskiya oblast the amount of credit received was 332% higher than the above
model can explain, while in Kaliningradskaya  Oblast the amount of credit received  was 81%
lower than the model indicates (see Table 7).  The inability of Ministry of Finance officials to
account for these differences illustrates  the lack of oversight and monitoring  of grain
procurement credits. Anecdotal  reports about the misuse of state credits provide further basis
for concern. Most significantly, credit for grain procurement in 1993 was reduced dramatically
without significant change in the volume and means of state procurement  of grain, and without
creating any disruptions in food supply.
19Table 7. Largest  and Smallest Regional Recipients of Grain Credits  in 1992
(in terms of the ratio of received credit to explained credit)
Largest Credit Surpluses
total  grain  grain  grain credit  unexplained
region  population  production  procurement  received  surplus/defici
(ths.)  (ths. tons)  (ths. tons)  (mil Rb)  t  (%)
Novgorodskiya  751  87  17.7  6550  332
Oblast  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Sverdlovskaiya  4707  1015  5.2  23000  242
O blast__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Khabarovskii  1812  22.2  0.5  6550  136
Republic Of  567  165.1  0  1670  98
K hakasiya  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Amurskaya  1050  710.2  142.4  6940  91
Oblast  ___________
_______  Largest  Credit  Deficits
Kalingradskaya  871  359.1  20.5  300  81
Oblast  -_  _  _  __  _  _  _
Moskovskaia  6646  613.7  39.7  1900  81
Oblast  l  _  _l
St. Petersburg  4990  0  0  1815  73
Permskaia  3091  910.4  90.5  1800  71
O blast_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Tomskaia  1001  420.7  44.8  8  30  69
O blast__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Source:  Based  on calculation  toim the above  model  For  more  details,  see Amelina,  Galbi,  Uspenskii  (1993).
Ensuring that the population is able to purchase food is an important  policy issue and one
that is central to domestic economic and political security. The traditional Soviet approach to the
problem is to provide massive state resources to organizations that in turn use the issue of state
secuity  to avoid public accountability  in their use of state resources. The grain embargo
imposed on the Soviet Union in 1980 undoubtedly played a key role in strengthening  this
approach with respect to grain. The appropriate path for reform is to decentralize  and privatize
state procurement functions. With respect to grain, the federal government's  role in providing
20procurement credit needs to be reduced much fiuther in order to stimulate  the development  of
new marketing and distribution  channels.
IV. Agricultural  Input  Subsidies
While calls for agricultural  subsidies have often referred to agriculture's "terms of trade"
with industry, the path of relative prices is difficult to identify in the rapidly changing Russian
economy.  Since mid-1992  consumer food prices  relative to non-food  prices have been rising,
although recently there has been some downward movement (see Figure 1). Moreover,
agricultural wages appear  to have grown more slowly than industrial  wages. On the other hand,
agricultural procurement  prices have risen much less rapidly than consumer  food prices, and the
agrcultural imput  price index and the industrial producer price index have risen more sharply
an  consumer food prices (see Table 8).
21Ratio Price  Indices
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SeptTable  8.  Terms  of Trade  Indicators  (index  relative  to Dec. 1991)
vear  Dec. 1992  Dec. 1993  May 1994
food consumer  22  197  315
prices
agricultural  proc.  13  117  159
pnces
agricultural  wages  10  84  124
agricultural  input  19  219  356
prices
non-food  consumer  27  199  292
prices
industrial  wages  13  121  347
industrial  producer  35  348  619
prices
Source: Goskomstat.
In intcrpreting  these  divergent  trends,  two points should  be recognized.  First,  the ratio of
food to non-food  consumer  prices  is a significantly  better quality  statistic  than  the other  statistics
in Table 8. These  two price  indices  are collected  at the same  time,  in the same  way,  through
direct surveys  of prices  observed  in consumer  markets. Wage  statistics  do not  capture  reductions
in working  time and late payment  -- factors  that have  been significant  throughout  the economy.
Moreover,  the wage  statistics  and the input  and industrial  price indices  are based  on reports  from
enterprises,  and bence  are less reliable. Reporting  meaningful  prices  for  industrial  intermediate
goods is particularly  problematic  since  markets  for such goods  are  currently  quite  thin.
More  importantlv.  agrculture's  "terms  of trade" is not a particularly  relevant  concept  for
thinking  about  the kinds  of problems  that  are central  to the current  situation  in Russian
agriculture. Analyses  of  the "terms  of trade"  for agriculture  tend to assume  that there is a stable
production  function  connecting  inputs  to outputs  in the various  sectors  of  the Russian  economy.
22*  But te  essence  of th  transition  problem  is that reorganization  of production  potentially  offers
very great increases  in productivity.  The important  questions  are the extent  to which  such
reorganization  is happening,  and how  to promote  it.
Concem  about  the tenns of trade of agriculture  seems  to have  been  reflected  in input  cost
subsidies  for agriculture.  In 1993,  according  to govermnent  decree,  agricultural  producers  were
compensated  for 30%  of the costs of mineral  fertilizers  and chemical  pesticides,  50%  of the cost
of fuel used in agricultural  production,  50%  of the cost of drought  insurance,  and 50%  of the cost
of farm equipment  and machinery.3 4 In 1994  the fuel subsidies  was lowered  to 30%,  while
additional  support  was  provided  for the purchase  of new  agricultural  machinery. 35
Table  9. Agicultural Input  Cost Subsidies  (bln.  of Rb)
year  1992  1993  1994  ."adgeted
fuel  70  13  8
fertilir  0  48  351
equipment  5  23
insurance  0  10  135
other expenses  76  35  285
total as share  of  0.83  0.08  0.13
GDP (%/6)
Sourme  F,cinkman (1994),  Table 2.
From  a budgetary  perspective,  input  cost subsidies  are not significant In the 1994  budget
input cost subsidies  amount  to only 6.7%  of budgeted  fimds  for agriculture. The  explanation  for
the small  role of input  cost  subsidies  is not hard  to recognize.  Agricultural  producers  have
frequently  argued  that input  suppliers,  rather  than agricultural  producers,  have  largely  benefited
from these subsidies.  Agricultural  producers  have thus  favored  producer  subsidies  over  input
subsidies.
23While  the overall  volume  of input  subsidies  has  fallen,  there  has been  a significant  and
undesirable  shift  in the composition  of subsidies.  The growth  in fertilizer  subsidies  favors  a
particular  type  of rural  activity  and promotes  a specialized  industry  likely  to become  dependent
on the govermment  program.  Given  the weaknesses  of the state  bureaucracy  and  the chaotic
circumstances,  the growth  of insurance  subsidies  is likely  to promote  corruption  and  create
significant  unanticipated  state  liabilities.
An input  subsidy  program  that  can  be effectively  administered  and  that  promotes  rural
development  should  subsidize  a relatively  standard  commodity  that is important  in  a wide  variety
of rural  and non-rural  activities.  While  input  subsidies  are in general  an inefficient  policy,  fiel
subsidies  are  probably  the least  bad form  of input  subsidy.  Fuel  subsidies  encourage  more
broad-based  development  that other  forms  of input  subsidies.  They  are also  easier  to administer
and monitor,  since,  among  other  factors,  fuel  prices  for  non-agriculural  users  provide  a
benchmark  for cost  comparisons.  Under  the Soviet  Union,  energy  prices  were  held  far below
wo: d levels. This encouraged  inefficient,  energy-intensive  production  throughout  the economy.
While  allowing  energy  prices  to rise to world  levels  is a crucial  reform,  this  may  also  be a policy
area where  some  marginal  support  can  be given  to rural  development.
The  regional  distribution  of fuel  subsidies  in 1992  is both more  easily  and  better
accounted  for  than  the regional  distribution  of grain  procurement  credits  in the same  year. A
regression  of regional  agricultural  fuel  subsidies  in region  r (FSr,  in millions  of rubles)  on the use
in agriculture  of gasoline  (Gr,  ths. tons)  and diesel  fuel (Dr,  ths. tons)  in region  r produces  the
model:6
24FSr = 27 + 3.2 Gr + 1.5Dr  + Ur,  r2=.95,  c = 125
(25) (.63)  (.33)
This model indicates that the subsidy per ton for gasoline and diesel fuel was Rb 3200 and Rb
1500 respectively. The average wholesale prices of gas and diesel fuel in the second and third
quarters of 1992  were Rb 5183 and Rb 3950.3' Given the error bounds associated  with the
estimates, the model is consistent with a program of 50% subsidies for fuel use. In contrast to
the model for grain credits,  this model does not incorporate possible  regional variations in fuel
prices.  Nonetheless, the model's r2 is higher than that for the grain credit  model, and the
standard error amounts  to 17%  of the mean regional subsidy, in contrast to 41% for the grain
credit program.  This indicates that there is much more reason to believe that fuel subsidies are
being directed to their intended purpose than are grain procurement credits.
Developments in energy supply in the agricultural sector also suggest the importance  of
support in this area relative to other forms of agricultural suppolt. In the first half of 1994
purchases of gasoline  and diesel fuel through retailers fell 51% relative to the level of the first
half of last year. In contrast,  the procurement of gasoline through direct contacts  with fuel
prod&icers  increased sharply; such supplies were 64% higher for gasoline and 140%  higher for
diesel fuel in the first half of 1994 relative to the first half of 199;.3  These direct deliveries
probably reflect barter deals between large agricultural enterprises and fuel producers. Such
trading mechanisms are inefficient,  perpetuate the power of political  comnections,  and place new
agricultural organizations  at a disadvantage. Temporary subsidies for rural fuel outlets could
25serve as a transitional  mechanism  that would help support market-based  purchases  of fuel while
lowering the costs of a broad  range of rural activities.
V. Production  Subsidies and Agricultural  Adjustment
A significant  share  of budgetary  spending on agricultural  falls under broad  and vague
programs for supporting  agricultural  production. In the 1994  budget 34% of spending  on
agricultural comes under  a single line item allocating money "to finance expenses  associated
with resolving special  problems  in agricultural  production."  In 1993 and 1992  general  support
for agicultural producers  was prinarily through directed credits  from the Central  Bank. See
Table 10. Such credits  were issued  in response to requests from producers. This  is the
traditional Soviet system in which  the agricultural bosses petition the central  authorities  for
money, plead their pressing  needs, stress the importance  of food to the people,  and promise to
produce results as soon as a sufficient  amount of money  is received.
26Table 10. General-Purpose Federal Transfers
to Agricultural Producers (bin. Rb)
year  1992  1993  1994  budget
total general-purpose  733  2155  5876
transfers
of which
livestock  producers  166  13  259
investment  118  440  1500
directed credit  417  1945  nila
total general tansfers as  4.05  1.33  0.94
share of GDP (%)  I
Source:  Fremkman  (1994),  Table 2.  1  have excluded from general trastbis sup.ort for  private
snucra,  t"x cxemptions,  and interest  rat  subsidies (the last item  amounted to Rb 1354  bbL  in 1993).
While the generally  ad-hoc  naure  of agricultural producer subsidies makes it virtually
impossible to monitor their use and evaluate their effects, the program of support for livestock
producers allows for slightly  more detailed description and analysis. Funds for livestock
subsidies come from both the federal and regional levels. As Table 11 indicates,  subsidies as a
percentage of procurement  prices fell by about half from 1992  to 1993.39  In constant 1992
rubles, total livestock subsidies  (federal and regional) fell from Rb 203 billion  to Rb 100 billion
from 1992 to 1993. Within this overall fall there was a sharp shift in the source  of subsidies.
Federal subsidies, which in 1992  amounted to 82% of total livestock subsidies,  became
negligible in 1993 while regional subsidies increased three-fold in real terms.'
27Table 11. Federal and Regional Livestock Subsidies
Total Volume  Subsidy  relative  to
(bln. Rb)  procurement  price (%)
year  1992  1993  1992  1993
milk  83.8  406  59  34
cattle  50.5  224.2  66  25
pigs  18.3  109.1  53  23
poultry  22.6  108.7  62  21
eggs  17  81.6  38  17
wool  0  24.8  0  56
sheep  5.2  13.9  182  33
Sousce: Minisbty  of Agricultum  (19%4).
There is already some evidence  that the cut in federal livestock subsidies  from 1992 to
1993 is promoting  market-oriented  adjustment. Regressing the 1992-1993  milk output change
on the output growth trend 1986-1992  and the level of subsidies  in 1992  indicates  that relatively
high subsidies in 1992  were correlated  with a relatively large output falls from 1992 to 1993.4
A movement from the fis  to the third quartile in the subsidy rate distribution  in 1992 was
associated with an additional  one percentage point drop in output from 1992  to 1993.42  This
effect is large relative to the overall  median regional output drop of I.M.
An economic  interpretation  of this evidence is that subsidies  were supporting  relatively
costly production,  and when these subsidies  were cut such production  fell. An important goal of
federal agriculuiral  policy should  be to promote low-cost production  and to encourage  the
transfer of resource from high-cost  producers to more efficient uses. Cutting  federal  producer
subsidies is an unportant step toward maklng production costs the key element  of enterprise
viability, and hence promoting  efficient adjustment.
28However,  the long-term effect of reducing  federal producer subsidies  depends  on
reactions at the local level. A significant  effect of the reduction in federal  subsidies  was an
increase (albeit less than offsetting) in regional  subsidies, which in turn probably  increased
differences in the level of subsidization  among  regions. Such differences  create  incentives  for
agricultural producers in regions with a high rate of agricultural subsidization  to use their cost
advantage to capture markets in regions with a low rate of subsidization. The result of such
action would be for regional  agricultural  subsidies  to flow out of the region with the export of
agricultural goods.  This creates pressure on regional administrators  either to restrict food
exports or to lower  subsidies. Regional administrators  who restrict food exports  create for
themselves the opportunity  to collect  rents by granting particular exporters  freedom  of action. A
regional leader with firm  political control might even find it useful  to raise agricultural
subsidies.'  This could allow him to convert agricultural  subsidies  financed  through  general
regional tax revenues  into eamings for particular  food trading concerns  that served  his personal
interests. 45
Two political  factors  are central  for avoiding  this very bad outcome. First, regional
democracy has to be strong  enough to recognize  and restrain the cost of agricultural  subsidies.
Second, the federal govemrnent  has to preserve  the rights of individuals  to participate  in
interregional  trade. This second task offers the federal government  the possibility  of creating
significant, market-oriented  alliances, and should  be taken up as a central  part of federal
agricultural policy.
29VI. Conclusions
Since the macroeconomic  reforms of January 1992, agricultural reform  in Russia has
proceeded via a budgetary squeeze on traditional forms of agricultural support. This high-level
budget cutting is clearly a crude way to shape agricultural policy. Yet altemative  paths for
policy face significant obstacles.  Within the agricultural sector the strength of the culture of
policy-making from the Soviet era is apparent in the forms of credit and subsidy  programs.  In
addition, the administrative  and regulatory capacity of the government has reached  a very low
level, and it is often not clear who are the ultimate recipients of agricultural credits and
subsidies.47 The result is that the state and collective farms have had to orient themselves  to
markets  because the state has become an unreliable, cash-strapped  partner.
Proposals for new agricultural  programs for the Russian govemment  have often
emphasized the need for the government to carry out its commitments and to concentrate
resources on promising investmnent  projects.4' While these objectives are desireable,  they have
little connection to reality. The traditional forms of agricultural policy that have been attempted
in the past three years are not sustinable  from a macroeconomic and budgetary  perspective,
hence the government could not credibly commit to them even if it wanted to.  Moreover,  the
political time horizons of state organs are too short to induce them to allocate  investment
effectively even if they had experience in doing so, and there is little information  available to
judge the ability of particular  organizations to carry out faithfully investment projects in the
current environment. More political stability and further development of markets and private
enterprise are needed for identifying  and carrying out effective state investment.
30'In 1990 there was a general forgiveness  of agricultural debt to the state, which amounted  at that time to Rb 20
billion (equivalent  to  3.1% of 1990  GDP). There have also been repeated  rescheduling  of the debts of Roskhleb,  the
state grain procurement  agent.  In addition,  real interest rates on credits have  often been  very low.  In 1993,  a year
in which inflation  was about 8500%,  a large share of agricultural  credits were issued  at interest  rates of 10-25%
yearly.
2The amount assigned for enterprises  and  organizations ofthe agriculturl complex  was given as 18.1  trillion rubles.
fzvestta  (1994)
3Total  disbursement  of Rb. 8.3 tn.  Ibid.
4The  allocation for agricultural  research  was Rb 381 bln.  See Budget  RF (1994). A rough mid-year  exchange  rate
of 3000 Rb/$ was used for the reported  figure.
5 See Hedlund  (1989).
'Banks also participated  as decision-makers  in the process of allocating directed credits  to private  farmers. Famerrs
claimed that banks refused to issue  credits  allocated  to them, while banks argued  that they were withholding  credit
because they were not receiving  interest  rate  subsidies promised to them.  The extent to which  the central  bank
actually forced semi-ommercial banks to pay the full cental bank rate on dieed  credits  to private  farmers is not
clear.  The nature and securitization  of "guarantees" that banks required  from AKKOR  and/or the Russian Farmer
Fund (an AKKOR  affiliate) in order  to give fanners credit is also not clear. See Kiselev  (1994),  pp. 78-9, esp. Table
4 and S.
7 'nfornation  received via personal  communication  with the Russian Farmer  FuLd,  Moscow.
8 Goskomstat  (1993a) p. 5.
9See  Brooks and Lerman (1994).
"'However,  at the local level complaints  about corruption and inequities  in the allocation  of state support were
frequent.
"Quoted in Wegren (1994) p. 226
*_It  is worth noting that a survey  of private  fanners found tXa only  about 30% of parcels  were allocated  dirtly
from state or collective farms. See Brooks  and Leman, p. 57.
313Goskomstat (1994), p. 45.
40ne might expect  that private  farmers would receive at least the state credit directed to them. On the other hand,
there have been frequent  reports  of state agricultural  credits being put to use outside agriculture.
5TMere  is also evidence  of the importance  of private  agricultural credit in China. A small amount of Chinese
evidence shows that private  credit in agriculture is about twice as large as the sum of that from the state agricultural
bank and agricultural  credit cooperatives. Lin (1987).
" Goskomstat (1993a) p. 5, (1994a) p. 14.
1 7See Prostennan and Hanstad  (1993).
is Others have reached  the same conclusion. Kiselev, a scholar in the Agmrian Institute in Moscow,  noed, "When
we evaluate the system  of state suport for peasant  farms, we can say that in many respects it preserves  the character
of regulation that is characteristic  of a staized economy." See Kiselev (1994) p. 80.
"Food  Decree RF (1994).
20See Freinkman and Titov (1994), p. 12.
21See Rossiya - 1994 (1994) Graph VI.6, p. 168.
2'Central Bank statistics show Rb 1797  bln. credits rescheduled in the agricultural  sector in 1993,  while Freinmana
(1994), Table 2, indicates  that Rb 4385 were bln. disbursed.
'Pavlovsky  (1968).
24This  company is explicitly  named in the federal decree. See for example Food Decree RF (1994). In earlier years
Roskhleb was also responsible  for regional procurement
25The  following section draws on ideas from Afanasev, Aslund, and Galbi (1993).
26A  simple example helps illustrate  the point  Suppose  that  e domestic supply curve facing the state is kdSded=Pd
and the intemational supply curve is kiSici =P;. Then a cost-minimizing  procurement  program involving  both
domestic and international  purchases would entail a ratio of  international  to domestic  prices of Pi/Pd =
(l+ed)I(l+ei).  Suppose  that Russia could buy as much grain as it wants on the world market  without effecting the
world price; this implies that ei=O. Suppose that domestically,  in order to procure 10%/  more grain, the government
32has to offer agricultural  producers  a 10% higher price; this means that ed=l.  Thus in the cost-minimizing
procurement program grain will be procured intemationally  at twice the price of domestic  grain.
27'ne  could argue that the independence  between  the variations in imports  and the variations  in the size of the
harvest might reflect stockpiling  in response  to international  price fluctuations. Particularly  in the 1980's,  this is
unlikely given hard-currency  government  budget constraints.
28The  following material  on grain procurement  credits draws upon Amelina,  Galbi, and Uspenskii  (1993).
9'Te interquartile  range in  the distribution  of regional procurement  prices was equal to 32%  of the median regional
procurement price.
30The number of regions that received  grain credits is 71.  This includes all the major regions of the Russian
Federation.  The model  sample consists  of these regions, minus Arkhangelskaia  Oblast  (Rb 600 mln. credit),
Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkesiya  (Rb 200 mln. credit), Sakhalinskaiya  Oblast (Rb  4000 mln. credit), and the
Jewish Autonomous  Oblast  (Rb 2170 mln. credit). Procurement volume or price data for these  regions were
missing.
31 There are about 150  million persons  in Russia, and average bread consumptions is about 120  kg per year. Hence
the model suggest that credits for bread-making  were about Rb 244 billion.
32 The volume of grain shipments  to a particular region does not significantly  affect the volume  of credit received by
the region.  This is not surprising. Why should Roskhleb need additional net credit from the state in order to allow
one branch of Roskhleb  to buy grain from another branch?
33These differences  cannot reflect movements  in prices during the year, since actual oblast level  procurement costs
were used in the analysis.
34Input subsidy ref.
35 Food Decree RF (1994).
36The number of regions used in estimating  the model is 72. These are all the regions for which subsidy  data was
available, and include all the major regions of the Russian Federation.
37OECD (1994).
333'Goskomstat  (I 994b), p. 43.
39Livestock  subsidies  are supposed  to be paid only for products delivered  to the state. However,  in the 1992
regional cross-section  the subsidy  rate per unit of milk and meat production  is not significantly  conrelated  with the
share of milk and meat sold to the state. There is a positive correlation  for eggs.
4ln  1993 federal livestock  subsidies  amounted  to 1.3%  of total livestock  subsidies.
41 Data from Ministry  of Agriculture  (1993b),  (1994b).
42The coefficient  of the logarithm  ofthe regional milk subsidy rate was -.050 with a standard error  of .015. The
sample for the regression  was the 72 regions of Russia for which data was available  (see above).
43This effect is not detectable  for eggs,  perhaps because the subsidy rate is significantly  lower  and the magnitude of
the output drops higher. This suggests  that factors other than subsidies  are driving  adjustments  in egg production.
I did not have data on meat output  separated  into cattle, pigs, and poultry  for a similar  analysis  with respect  to
these products.
44lhe  elasticity  of subsidies  with  respect  to regional fiscal expenditure (controlling  for the volume  of procurement)
is statistically  significant  and around  0.5.  The share of a region's  population  in agriculture  also has a significant
effect on the subsidy rate.  The political  economy of regional  agricultural  subsidies in Russia  deserves  further
exploration.
*I am grateful to Lev Freinkman  for pointing  out this possibility  to me.
4" For a discussion  and example  of the importance  of the culture  of policy-making,  see MurreUl,  Dunn, and Korsun
(1994).
4'  See Izvestiya  (1994).
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